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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, by and through
ITS ROAD COMMISSION,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.
(DAVID DOUGLAS HOOPER)
and

Case No.
11580

IRRIGATION COMPANY,
SOUTH SLATERVILLE
Defendant-Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE
The Respondent sued to condemn and acquire fee title
to .25 of an acre of land for the north-south freeway west of
Ogden City over Appellant's canal. The highway project was
known as I-15-8(7)338 and the parcel of land is referred to
as No. 15-8:77D:A.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried on the 18th and 19th of December
1968; before the Honorable Charles G. Cowley, Judge of the
Second Judicial District, in and for Weber County, Utah without a jury. The issues were the compensation due the appel1
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lant by reason of the taking of the land and the severance
damage to the remaining land.
The trial court gave the appellant $450 for the actual
value of the land taken and gave nothing for severance damage.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant asks that a new trial be granted on the
question of severance damages.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Willard Canal runs north and south parallel to and
about 300 feet east of where the freeway here involved was
later built (T-102 & Exhibit P-1). Approximately one year
before this condemnation suit was filed the appellant purchased a strip of land 1630 feet long east and west and 2 rods
wide north and south and constructed a concrete canal 12
feet wide at the top by 2 feet at the bottom and 3 feet deep,
with a 12 foot maintenance road along its south bank. (T-12,
T-13, T-15, T-16). The road dead ended at the west side of the
Willard Canal Right of Way on the east end of Appellant's
canal (T-164, T-165, T-166). Appellant's water headgate was
up in the Willard Canal-some 35 to 40 feet east across Willard Canal Property and up a steep 6 to 8 foot canal bank.
(T-39, T-47, T-154-172-173). Before this freeway was built the
appellant's irrigation co. was able to travel on its own land
the entire 1630 feet along its cement canal for repair work
and maintenance. To get to its Willard Canal headgate its
people could drive along the canal road, park at the Willard
Canal bank and walk 30 to 40 feet up the bank to the diversion. To get power machinery to the headgate it was always
necessary to travel up 12th Street to Wall then over to 17th
Street and down along the Willard Canal bank to the headgate.
2
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The freeway was built at right angles over the canal with
a high bridge. Approximately 270 feet of the appellant's canal and road were spanned by the freeway bridge. (T-270.)
When the respondent built the bridge over appellant's canal
they allowed the slope coming down toward the canal from
the south end of the bridge to be built and concreted out into
the middle of appellant's canal road. Respondent took some
71/2 feet of the road and left the canal company some 41/2
feet to travel on. (T-19, T-35, T-36, T-89). This means that
the appellant can travel and maintain its canal from the west
end by truck and power equipment east to the freeway-over
its 12 foot road-then under the freeway for 270 feet it has
nothing but a 4 1/2 foot path. Then east of the freeway it still
has its 12 foot maintenance road but can not get draglines
or backhoes or other power equipment to it because of the
freeway on the west and the Willard Canal property on the
east. The appellant owns no right-by deed or use to bring
its power equipment down off the Willard Canal bank to its
12 foot maintenance road. It has the right to come along the
Willard Canal bank to get to its headgate but not the right
to get to its maintenance road. (T-163 to T-173).
The appellant called Lou Wangsgard, a consultant civil
engineer as a witness. (T-33). He testified that the respondents
built its concrete slope out into appellant's canal road, thus
preventing motor vehicle traffic along it. (T-35 to T-38). This
has caused the appellant to travel an extra mile and one-half
each way to check its headgate diversion on Wilalrd Canal.
Each time they do this they have to back up four-tenths of a
mile to 17th Street because the Willard Canal bank isn't wide
enough to turn on. (T·38, T-39). Mr. Wangsgard testified that
two means could be used to correct the State's error in the
building of its slope. One way would be to cut the concrete
slope back for 7112 feet and build a concrete retaining wall
so that the present road could be used and the other would
be to cover the canal and build a new road over it. (T-41).
3
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The first method would cost $10,500 and the second method
$9,000. (T-44).
POINTS ON APPEAL
POINT 1
THE LOWER COURT ERRORED IN APPLYING THE
RULES OF LAW LAID DOWN IN THE CASE OF STATE
ROAD COMMISSION VS. UTAH SUGAR COMPANY DBAIDAHO SUGAR COMPANY TO THE CASE AT HAND.
A. IN THE SUGAR COMPANY CASE, PUBLIC POLICY, NECESSITY FOR PROGRESS AND SAFETY REQUIRED THAT THE FREEWAY BE BUILT IN THE APPROXIMATE LOCATION OF THE FORMER HIGHWAY. HERE NO
SUCH REQUIREMENT EXISTED FOR THE TAKING OF APPELLANT'S ROAD. A DIFFERENT RULE OF LAW SHOULD
APPLY WHERE THE CONDEMNING BODY EXERCISES ITS
PRIVILEG WITH A TOTAL DISREGARD FOR THE RIGHTS
OF THE CITIZENS IT INCONVENIENCES AND WITH NO
ATTENTION PAID TO PRIVATE INJURY. WHERE IN THE
SUGAR COMPANY CASE THE STATE ACTED WITH PRUDENCE AND PLANNING AND IN THE BEST POSSIBLE
AND SAFEST WAY FOR ALL CONCERNED. IN THIS CASE
IT APPEARED TO BE TRYING TO INJURE THEM.
B. IN THE SUGAR COMPANY CASE THE CANAL
COMPANY WAS NOT PREVENTED FROM GETTING TO
ANY PART OF ITS CANAL. IN THE CASE AT HAND THE
APPELLANT IS BLOCKED FROM GETTING POWER EQUIPMENT TO THE EAST POINT OF ITS CANAL UNLESS IT
ACQUIRES FROM THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION THE
RIGHT TO TRAVEL ACROSS ITS LAND.

ARGUMENT
POINT II

The lower court decided this case strictly on the decision
4
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in the State Road Commission vs. Utah Sugar Company, dba
Utah-Idaho Sugar Company 22 Utah 2d77, 448P2d901. (Record
on Appeal page 13). It errored in applying the rules of law laid
down in the Utah Sugar Company case to the case at hand.
The Sugar Company case cites and sets forth the pertinent
statutes and cases governing general situations such as found
there and in this case. To paraphrase or repeat them would
be a waste.
It appears clear under Utah law "that if the State needs

land for a freeway then public policy and the necessity for
progress require that the land owner suffer any inconvenience and extra expense caused by "round about travel." This
is a harsh law as it applies to the individual whose land is
taken but is undoubtedly offset by the benefit to the public.
The lower court in the case here being appealed failed to
note the differences in situation between the two cases.
A. In the Sugar Company case its canals before the
condemnation came up to the existing highway and the canal
company men even then had to cross the fence and highway to get to their next segment of canal. The state had no
choice but to widen the freeway and make it non-access. This
did not alter the canal company's rights. It just caused them
to travel a bit further on a safer road than they did before.
No arbitrary, negligent, or rough shod attitude was apparent on the part of the Road Commission. This is not true
in the case at hand. The bridging over the appellant's canal
and road way does them no harm and if this had been done
properly and with only a slight amount of consideration for
the land owner there would have been no problem. There
is no reason shown at the trial, nor is there any reason or
logic apparent now why the Respondent decided to build
their slope protection down into the middle of the appellant's
maintenance road. For some 270 feet under the bridge the
5
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

State placed slope fill and concrete some 71/2 feet onto the
appellant's 12 foot road. (T-152). An engineer certainly would
not be necessary to tell the State people that this would stop
the canal people from properly working their canal and from
getting from the west half of their canal to the east half of
it. The State could have prevented the problem without damage or inconvenience to the State by making its concrete
slope a little steeper. Where it was to be a concrete slope
there could have been no sluffing problem caused by the
slight increase. Mr. Wangsgard, an engineer, testified that
the slope could have been so poured as to preserve the canal company's road. (T-36).
Here then is a different situation than the Sugar Company case. Here the State Road Commission by its arbitrary
judgment and for no reason shown in the record elects to
destroy the canal road and access to the east part of appellant's canal. When the condemning body acts without need
and without observing proper consideration for the land
owner it should no longer be protected by the "Public Policy" rule. Utah statutes, Utah Code Annotated 78-34-3(5)
and 78-34-2 provide that private land can be taken by the
State but it must be "compatible with the greatest public
good and the least private injury." Here neither one was
shown to exist by the respondent. Little attention was paid
to private injury.
B. In the Sugar Company case the canal workers could
still get to any point of their canal with their equipment.
After the condemnation, they had to use the safer route along
the freeway and couldn't cross the highway directly. In this
case the appellant's workmen can drive up their canal road
to the freeway, then they must leave all tractors, backhoes,
draglines, and trucks and walk 270 feet under the bridge
to get to the remainder of their canal and then the rest of
6
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the way on foot. They can follow the same route to get to
the headgate or diversion they have always used by going
around and down 17th Street but this means they have to
back out each time along the Willard Canal bank for some
four-tenths of a mile. (T-39). In addition the appellant has
no road or right-of-way to get from the Willard Canal down
to their maintenance road some 40 feet to the west. (T-163
to T-168, T-170, T-172, T-173, T-176). Their maintenance road
is also lower in elevation than the Willard Canal bank road.
The State witness testified that rights of way could be obtained by appellant to get onto their maintenance road east
of the freeway but the witnesses were speaking without personal knowledge and from hearsay. (T-91, T-93, T-94, T-145,
T-148, T-153, T-158 to 159).
Where the appellants can no longer get onto and use
their canal and road east of the freeway without acquiring
an access from some 3rd party then there is an actual taking
of some of their property rights. It was error for the lower
court to find that there was no damage to appellant's land
caused by the severance.
In Southern Pacific Company vs. Arthur 10 Utah 2d 306,
352 P2d 693 the land owners owned land on each end of
Promontory Point and had sheep grazing, watering and trailing rights in and across Little Valley. The railroad condemned land in the valley to extract dirt and fill material and
made it impossible for the sheep to cross naturally and drink
where customary. To get them around the pits would take
extra moving and driving. The court held there had been
a damage to the land owners on each side of the valley. "The
pits affected all of the owner's lands for grazing purposes
and not just the operation of the particular acreages from
which the sand and gravel was taken." (page 697).
7
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POINT II
If the appellant in part were cut off from the east 300

to 400 feet of its canal by the freeway and had no access to
it for its maintenance by power equipment then the appellant suffered damages. (T-152 and Exhibit Dl). The appellant gave testimony that it had no access from the east over
the Willard Canal property. (T-163 to 168, T-170, to 172, T173, T-176). The lower court errored in allowing Respondent
to use hearsay testimony to refute appellant's witnesses and
exhibits. No Witness for Respondent testified of his own
knowledge that appellant had a right-of-way from the S-P
Roadway on the north or down over the Willard Canal property from the east or that they had ever used such a way.
(T-91, T-93, T-94, T-112 to 114, T-148, T-153, T-158, T-159).
Except for the hearsay testimony improperly admitted, the
evidence shows that the freeway blocked appellants from the
use of their land east of the freeway.
CONCLUSION
The State's carelessness or inattention to details caused
the appellant's roadway under the freeway bridge to be reduced from 12 feet to 41/2 feet-for a span of 270 feet-(the
State placed a 16-foot gate on each side of the bridge so that
the canal company could have access to its 41/2 foot wide road,
indicating an engineering error in either the fence design or
the concrete slope protection. Mr. Cook testified that the
appellant would lose in damage because of the narrowing
of its road the sum of $8,000 over the next 32 years. T-60).
Mr. Wangsgard testified that it would cost the appellant $9,000 to pipe the canal under the freeway bridge and $10,500
to cut back the concrete slope protection and build a retaining wall to correct the State's narrowing of this canal maintenance road. (T-44). The total injury and loss of use of appellant's property was caused in the Respondent's failure to
8
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use care and minimize private injury. Without the Respondent's needless and autocratic act in electing to use the appellant's canal road when it did not need to, there would have
been no injury or continuing damage of the appellant. In this
case an actual taking of appellant's ground, a segment of its
road right in the middle of its canal property, has caused
damage to its total canal property and has partially severed
the canal property east of the bridge.
Therefore, appellant asks that a new trial be awarded
or, in the alternative, that appellant be awarded the cost of
repairing the damage caused to its canal road.
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